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1. Background
In this paper Kauffeld is looking at the issue of the arguer's dialectical
obligations, with reference to the challenges posed by Govier (1998b), these
challenges being directed against my views about the dialectical tier (1996). In
nuce I claim that arguments must have a dialectical tier in which the arguer
discharges her dialectical obligations, such as answering objections and
showing how her position is an improvement on alternatives. Govier argues
that this position is vulnerable to two serious objections: The Discrimination
Problem (is it possible to specify in any meaningful way the arguer's dialectical
obligations) and The Regress Problem (If every argument must have a
dialectical tier, then it looks like we are involved in an infinite (unhappy)
regress.
In his paper, Kauffeld brings the resources of rhetoric to bear on these
problems. Specifically, Kauffeld explores the possibility of assistance from
Whately's approach to argument (Section #3). He also uses the resources of
speech act theory (which he describes as broadly Gricean in character) to
investigate parallel cases where the matter of dialectical obligations arises-the case of proposing and the case of advising, In both cases his analysis is
anchored by examination of concrete examples. For his analysis of proposing
he turns to The Federalist Papers (written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay under
the pseudonym of Publius and published in 1787-88); for his analysis of
advising, he turns to Washington's Farewell Address. I will not be able to do
justice to the breadth and depth of Kauffeld's work in this brief comment. I have
some reservations about his proposals, insofar as I understand them, (and I
am not sure that I do). So I will focus on those aspects of his paper that strike
me as having that right combination of being both evocative yet somewhat
problematic.
In particular, as I thought about his paper, I found myself gravitating toward the
notion a prima facie case, or an apparently adequate case. I also want to flag
are some of the helpful ideas that emerge from Kauffeld's analysis of
proposing. Finally I want to discuss one of the concerns he raises in the last of
is four concluding observations.
2. Can the Whatelian Approach Help Save the Dialectical Tier?
Drawing upon Whately's mode of analysis, Kauffeld explores the possibility
that we may solve The Regress Problem by drawing upon the notions of
presumption, burden of proof and prima facie case, or apparently adequate
case. (I shall use the latter phrase and abbreviate it AAC.) He writes:

According to Whately and his students, in context of disagreement, it is often
possible to discern presumptions which serve to provide advocates on one
side or the other with good practical reason to accept the obligation to
substantiate their position by providing reasons in support of their claims and
by answering doubts.
[Whatelians] hold that the parties with the burden of proof have the obligation to
provide an apparently adequate case, when that limit is reached the burden of
proof then shifts to those who occupy opposite positions and/or want to
continue to raise doubts and objections.
If Whatelians could give a satisfactory account of a prima- facie case, we
would have a conception of argumentative adequacy at the dialectical tier
which place a limit on the arguer's dialectical obligations and, so, provides a
conceptual basis for limiting Govier's regress.
The crucial question thus becomes: Can we make sense of the notion of an
AAC? If we can, will it help us to understand the arguer's dialectical obligations
and to avoid The Regress Problem posed by Govier?
Question 1: Can we make sense of this notion?
On this question, Kauffeld himself seems somewhat ambivalent. On the one
hand, he discusses traditional rhetorical accounts of AAC and, following Scott,
rejects them. On the other hand, in his discussion of proposing, he continues to
make use of it:
The qualification here is that by establishing a prima-facie case, the proposer
is in a strong position to call for termination of the deliberation; the prospect of
a proposer occupying that position is not to be taken lightly in practical or
theoretical terms. However, the larger answer to Govier's regress does not
depend on whether the proposer's prima facie case brings the argument to a
conclusion, but whether the criteria for such a case provide a principled (nonad hoc) basis for claiming that the proposer has fulfilled her dialectical
obligations. I hope it is now clear that this is the case.
Since Kauffeld has not provided an analysis of an AAC, and since this strikes
me as a promising tool for analysis, I plan see what sense can be made of this
notion--given what Kauffeld has said.
First, an AAC will be weaker than what Govier calls a Good Case, and weaker
still than what she calls an Exhaustive Case.
Comment: Such an approach falls in line with what I have elsewhere (1996)
called The Continuum Hypothesis; i.e., the position that our theory of argument
evaluation must allow for verdicts on the merits of argument that range from
very strong--say Govier's "Exhaustive"--down through less strong verdicts such
as "Good" and, here, Apparently Adequate. Our theory of evaluation must be
such as to support and allow such gradations.

Second, the rhetorical literature presents at least two ways of understanding
this notion of AAC. One is that a case is AAC when it "stands on its own and
demands rebuttal". Kauffeld does not say much about this and, I must confess,
it does not seem promising. The other attempt is the notion that a case is an
AAC "when it is complete and consistent." Kauffeld shares Scott's scepticism
about the adequacy of either of these glosses, stating that they are "scarcely
adequate and probably circular." Neither of these strikes me as likely to pay
dividends in analyzing the idea of an AAC, though in his discussion of these,
Kauffeld does bring to the table some potentially useful ideas.
I'd like to highlight them here. The first is the idea of stock issues (from
Whately), a notion which is functionally equivalent to what Govier terms "the
most salient objections." I will be saying more about this attempt to limit the
arguer's responsibilities in my paper on Saturday. The second interesting
notion is that of completeness in an argument, which according to Scott has
three components: the overall structure (the case), the primary unit of structure
(the contention) and the material of the structure (the evidence). Kauffeld takes
this analysis as parallel to the distinction the illative core and the dialectical tier.
If these approaches won't work, what else might we try? How might we make
sense of an AAC? I can think of two ways we might attempt to unpack this,
neither of which seems likely to work.
The first approach might be to water down Govier's requirement for a Good
Case, just as in arriving at her notion of what counts as a Good Case, she
watered down the requirements she set forth for an Exhaustive Case. For
reasons I will make clear in a moment, I don't think this approach will work.
(Though not germane to this discussion, I want to say that I am not at all sure
that the way to define a Good Case is by first defining an Exhaustive Case and
then weakening it.)
Another approach would be to adopt requirements of relevance, sufficiency,
and acceptability (Johnson and Blair, 1993), construing them as criteria that
allow for various degrees of satisfaction. Then one could define an AAC as
one in which the criteria of have been satisfied to some minimal degree. (This
would not be the whole story of course.)
There are, I am sure, other ways to approach the matter, but if my suggestion
that an argument is not complete without something like a dialectical tier, we
are unlikely to be able to get the help we want from AAC. For either an AAC
has a dialectical tier, or it does not. If it does, then the notion of an AAC will
give rise to the very problem is supposed to solve. For now we will have to ask
the same questions that lead Govier to the Discrimination Problem and The
Regress Problem: Which objections must the arguer deal with to make an
AAC? How we avoid the exfoliation of supplementary arguments for the AAC?
On the other hand, if the AAC does not contain a dialectical tier, then it is
difficult to see how the case can be "apparently" acceptable. Can a case be
apparently acceptable if it does not deal with any of the objections that are

known to exist? (This may be the way out.)
Question 2: Supposing that we can make sense of an AAC (without running
into the difficulties mentioned above), would it allow us to solve The Regress
Problem?
Let me again quote Kauffeld:
By establishing an AAC, the proposer is in a strong position to call for
termination of the deliberation.... However, the larger answer to Govier's
regress does not depend on whether the proposer's prima facie case brings
the argument to a conclusion but whether the criteria for such a case provide a
principled (non-ad-hoc) basis for claiming the arguer has fulfilled her dialectical
obligations.
I see how the notion of an AAC will help us clarify the problem of who has the
burden of proof. If the arguer has put forward an AAC, then the burden of proof
is shifted to the respondent. But how exactly does the establishment of this
avoid the regress?
Finally, shifting to The Discrimination Problem, what are we looking for here?
Kauffeld states that the issue is whether the criteria provide a "principled (nonad-hoc) basis for claiming that the arguer has fulfilled her dialectical
obligations". What do we know about such criteria? According to Kauffeld, if I
am reading him correctly, such criteria must be non-ad-hoc, principled,
pragmatic, contextual and prudential. These adjectives collect nicely around
the Whatelian intuitions presented at the beginning:
Whatelians hold this obligation ... is distributed relative to the presumptions
which govern the dialogue.
...as this is a matter of prudence, we should expect that would be various and
flexible criteria for what objections merit consideration and that those criteria
should apply depending on the circumstances.
... the larger answer to Govier's regress does not depend on whether the
proposer's prima facie case brings the argument to a conclusion, but whether
the criteria for such a case provide a principled (non-ad hoc) basis for claiming
that the proposer has fulfilled her dialectical obligations.
I sense a tension here between the view which says that the arguer's dialectical
obligations are a matter of context and circumstance; and the desire for nonad-hoc, principled criteria. This tension is also reflected in the contrast
between process-oriented approaches and product-oriented approaches
which Kauffeld has discussed, as well as in the contrast between approaches
which focus on production of arguments vs. those which focus on the evaluation
of arguments; and perhaps as well in the historical tension between rhetoric
and logic. Kauffeld writes:

Johnson derives the obligation to answer doubts, objections and opposing
positions from the uniform or paradigmatic requirements of the practice of
argument... Whatelians derive it from the social context in which the argument
is set.
There is of course no "either-or" here, and no need to choose between them.
We may view argument as both process and product, study it both in the
setting of its production and also its evaluation, from both rhetorical and logical
points of view.
These are healthy tensions.
For those philosophers and logicians who are sometimes skeptical of the
rhetorical approach, I recommend a careful reading of Kauffeld's nuanced
analyses of proposing and advising
where he reminds us of the proposer's "larger duty to make prudent use of her
addressee's time and energy", and his discussion of the Federalist Papers to
illustrate "the grounds on which objections may fail to merit consideration".
3. Kauffeld's Concluding Observations
Kauffeld concludes with four observations only the last one of which can I
comment on here. I am concerned about his intimation that my approach
(based on the view that argumentation is an instrument for rational persuasion)
might lead to "a reductive view of good practice in argumentation which leads
us to underestimation of the usefulness of reason in human affairs".
Were I convinced that my view of argument did lead to an "underestimation of
the usefulness of reason in human affairs," then that would be a very strong
objection against it. However, I think that just the opposite is true. That the
traditional view (which contains, I would argue) an undervaluation of argument
as an instrument of rational persuasion) has led to a general decline of the
belief in the power and usefulness of reason in human affairs, and that many
factors have as it were conspired to bring this about, among them the
following:
the emergence of other methods of persuasion (advertising, polling and
sampling, negotiation, conflict resolution, etc.); the erosion of argumentation in
philosophy, in which both postmodern and analytic philosophy are implicated;
and their views of argument are cental here. Postmodernism because of the
tendency to distrust argumentation and logic as simply part of the oppression
and hegemonic maneuvering of dead white males to maintain power; the
analytic strand because of its continuing infatuation with formal deductive
models of argument and their tendency to confuse argument, implication and
inference. (For further see my 1999.)
In my view, these factors have together with others in the lifeworld (TV) have led
to a decline in the fortunes of practice of argumentation. My judgement is that

the best hope for revitalizing it is not to loosen but rather tighten the reins.
Thus for example I have concerns when Kauffeld uses the following exchange
as an example of "an argument which preclude(s) the dialectical possibility of
further doubts and objections":
A: Please, give me my car keys.
B: I don't have your keys.
A: I don't believe you; you had them last.
B: They're in your pocket.
To be sure, his exchange bears some resemblance to an argument, but it is
located at the far side of the spectrum--a long way from the centre where I
locate the paradigmatic sense of argument. But that is a discussion for another
time.
To conclude, Kauffeld's paper provides ample illustration of the point I make at
the end of my paper, which is that progress on this important issue of how we
understand the arguer's dialectical obligations requires the joint efforts of
researchers from many disciplines. His paper makes abundantly clear the
riches that the rhetorical tradition has to offer.
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